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Etheredge: The Castle Doctrine: Extension of the Rule to Co-Occupants

CASE COMMENTS
THE CASTLE DOCTRINE: EXTENSION
OF THE RULE TO CO-INHABITANTS
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999)
Christy S. Etheredge*
Weiand, the Petitioner, shot and killed her husband in their apartment
during a violent argument.' Petitioner asserts that at the time of the fatal
shooting she feared that she might be killed or seriously injured by her
spouse.2 Petitioner's defenses at trial included battered spouse syndrome
and self-defense.3
A jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder.4 Petitioner
appealed the conviction, asserting that the trial judge erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on the "castle doctrine."5 Bound by the Florida Supreme
Court's prior holding in Bobbitt, which stated that the castle doctrine does
not apply to co-inhabitants, the Second District found no reversible error
and affirmed the trial court's decision. 6 The Florida Supreme Court
reviewed the decision as a question of great public importance and HELD,
the castle doctrine, which states that a party in fear of being killed or
seriously injured by someone in their own home does not have a duty to
retreat, but may instead resort to deadly force if necessary to avoid great
bodily harm or death, is applicable when the attacker is a co-inhabitant.7
The castle doctrine, which creates an exception to the common law duty
* This Case Comment is dedicated to Johnny, my idol; Tammy, my inspiration; and
especially to Chuck, my husband, partner, personal cheerleader, and the one who, with his
unconditional love and nonstop support, makes it all both possible and worthwhile.
1.See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 1049.
5. See id. at 1047. The standard jury instruction on the castle doctrine reads:

If the defendant was attacked in [his][her] own home or on [his][her] own
premises, [he][she] had no duty to retreat and has the lawful right to stand
[his][her] ground and meet force with force, even to the extent of using force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent... death
or great bodily harm to [himself][herself] ....
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), Justifiable Use of Deadly Force § 3.04(d),
at49 (1985).
6. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1047; State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1982).
7. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1058.
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to retreat before resorting to force for self-defense, was defined in Pell v.
State.' In Pell, the defendant was convicted of murder for shooting and
killing the victim.9 The shooting occurred in the defendant's garage during
a confrontation instigated by the victim.' 0 The defendant appealed his
conviction, asserting that the jury instructions regarding self-defense and
duty to retreat should have included the castle doctrine exception." The
court held that a person generally has a duty to retreat from attack if at all
possible before the use of self-defense is justified. 2 However, the court
reasoned that when the victim is being attacked in his own home or on his
own premises by a party who is unlawfully there, during an altercation
which he did not instigate, he is entitled to stand his ground and may use
whatever force a reasonable man would use to prevent his own death or
serious bodily injury. 3 Since the shooting occurred in the defendant's own
garage, the court held that the jury instructions should have included an
advisory that the defendant had no duty to retreat before resorting to selfdefense. 14
While Pell only addressed the application of the castle doctrine when
the aggressor is a trespasser, in Hedges the court expanded the castle
doctrine to include situations where the aggressor is an invitee. 5 The
defendant in Hedges was convicted of manslaughter for killing her
paramour while he was at her home. 6 She appealed her conviction,
contending that she was defending herself in her own home and, therefore,
8. 122 So. 110, 116 (Fla. 1929). By statute, a person is permitted to use deadly force when
it is reasonably necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury. See FLA. STAT. §
776.012 (1999). While not codified in the statutes, the duty to retreat before resorting to self
defense has emerged in the common law and is based on the policy that one should use all
reasonable means to avoid taking a human life while securing one's own safety. See Hedges v.
State, 172 So. 2d 824,827 (Fla. 1965); Connerv. State, 361 So. 2d774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978);
see also Danford v. State, 43 So. 593, 596 (Fla. 1907) (holding that one has a duty to avoid
difficulty if its possible to do so without exposing oneself to greater danger).
9. See Pell, 122 So. at 112.
10. See id. at 114. The victim in Pell was a police officer who was rooting around in the
defendant's garage with an illegal search warrant. See id. at 114-15. When the defendant asked the
officer for the search warrant, the officer hit the defendant and then raised his gun to shoot him. See
id. at 114. In making its decision, the court emphasized that the defendant did not initiate the
altercation and that the victim did not have a legal reason for being on the defendant's property. See
id. at 116.
11. See id.
12. See id.; see also supra note 8.
13. See Pell, 122 So. at 114. The court qualified this rule, however, by stating that the castle
rule exception to the duty to retreat does not apply when the defendant lies in wait for the adversary,
initiates the altercation, or is mutually responsible for the altercation which leads to the use of
deadly force. See id.
14. See id. at 114.
15. See id. at 116; see also Hedges, 172 So. 2d at 826-27.
16. See Hedges, 172 So. 2d at 825.
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was entitled to ajury instruction on the castle doctrine. 7 The State asserted
that this exception only applies when the attacker is a trespasser. 8
However, the court held that a party under assault in one's own home does
not have a duty to retreat, whether the attacker is a trespasser or an invitee,
because when a person is in his or her own home, he or she is already in
the sanctuary to which a party under attack would normally retreat.19
Although the Florida Supreme Court was willing to extend the castle
rule exception to the duty to retreat to include invitees, it refused to allow
this exception to apply when the assailant was a co-occupant of the home.2"
In Bobbitt, the defendant shot and killed her husband in their home after
he attacked her.21 The jury convicted her of manslaughter.22 The defendant
moved for a new trial, asserting that she had no duty to retreat since the
attack leading to the shooting occurred in her home.23 The trial court
granted a new trial and the State appealed.24 Although the First District
Court was willing to concede to the defendant's position, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the castle rule exception was not appropriate in
this case because the attacker and the defendant were both lawful residents
of the home.y The court distinguished this situation from Pell and Hedges
by noting that in Pell, the attacker was a trespasser with no legal right to
be on the premises, and in Hedges, by becoming an aggressor the invitee
lost the legal right to be in the home.26 On the other hand, in Bobbitt, the
court reasoned that the attacker, as a resident of the home, retained a legal
17. See id. at 826-27. In this case, the court refers to the castle doctrine as the "home rule
exception." Id. at 826.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 827.
20. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So.2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1982).
21. See id. at 725.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 725-26. The First District relied on Hedges in reaching its decision to apply the
castle doctrine to a co-inhabitant, reasoning that in both Hedges and the case before them, the
attackers were not intruders in the home, and thus the same rule should apply. See id. at 725. Other
appellate courts wrestled with this issuebefore the Supreme Court decided Bobbitt. See, e.g., Rippie
v. State, 404 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding that a co-occupant has a limited duty
to retreat within the residence but does not have to retreat from the dwelling altogether); Conner
v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 775-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (receding from its earlier extension of the
castle doctrine to co-occupants and holding that "human life is sacred and that due regard for it far
outweighs any indignity or cowardice involved in having to retreat from one's own family");
Stevenson v, State, 285 So. 2d 61, 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (reasoning that the castle doctrine
applies to co-occupants as both have equal authority and control of the premises); Watkins v. State,
197 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (asserting that home is the ultimate sanctuary so when
both parties have an equal right to be there, a person attacked by a co-occupant has no duty to
retreat).
26. See Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 725-26.
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right to be there even as an aggressor.27 Therefore, "both Bobbitt and her
husband had equal rights to be in the 'castle' and neither had the legal right
' Thus, the court made it very clear that the castle
to eject the other."28
doctrine applied when the attacker was a trespasser or invitee, but not
when he or she was a co-inhabitant of the residence.29
In the instant case, however, the court reversed its holding in Bobbitt
and receded in part from Hedges.30 The court held that the castle rule
exception to the duty to retreat applies when the attacker against whom a
party defends themselves is a co-inhabitant.31 The court further held,
however, that there is a limited duty to retreat to the extent possible within
the residence.32
In reaching this decision, the instant court first discussed the common
law origins of the duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force. 33 The
court explained that the duty to retreat stems from the policy that one
should do everything possible to avoid danger before resorting to selfdefense.' The castle doctrine exception to this duty is also strongly rooted
in the common law. 35 The court cited the policy reasons behind this
exception, emphasizing the importance that has traditionally been placed
on the idea that no man should be a fugitive from his own home because
the home is man's ultimate sanctuary; thus, one forced to flee from his own
home would have no safer place to go.36 In addition, since a man's home
is viewed as his castle, he should be37 entitled to protect it from invasion
rather than be forced to flee from it.
After discussing the general origins of the duty to retreat and the castle
doctrine, the court next traced the evolution of the castle doctrine as it has
been applied in Florida, including its extension to invitees and its previous
limitation regarding co-inhabitants. 3' Reflecting on its decision in Bobbitt,
the court noted that its earlier holding showed less concern for human life
27. See id. at 726.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 725-26.
30. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1058. The court only receded from the part of the Hedges
decision relating to the castle doctrine. See Hedges, 172 So. 2d at 826-27. The remainder of the
Hedges decision addresses whetherjury instructions in homicide cases should include explanations
of justifiable and excusable homicide. See id. at 825.
31. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1058.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 1049-50.
34. See id. at 1049; see also supra text accompanying note 8.
35. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049-50.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 1050.
38. See id. at 1050-5 1. The court also considered the application of the castle doctrine in
other states and noted that the majority did not impose a duty to retreat from the home when
attacked by someone who has a legal right to be there, either as an invitee or guest. See id. at 1051.
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than for property and possessory rights.39 Specifically, the court noted that
when it decided Bobbitt,the main concern was that both parties had a legal
right to be in the home.40 The instant court recognized, however, that the
holding in Bobbitt,when considered with Hedges, created an inconsistency
such that a party killing a significant other who had been a frequent invitee
in the home had more legal protection than one spouse who kills the other
in their joint home."
In addition to recognizing the inequitable distinction between invitees
and inhabitants created by the court's prior holding in Bobbitt, the instant
court recognized that the Bobbitt holding had an adverse impact on
domestic violence victims which currently necessitated correction. 42 For
example, the court cited studies indicating that an abused spouse forced to
retreat from the home (as the holding in Bobbitt would require) is more
likely to suffer death or serious bodily injury when attempting to leave than
at any other point in time.43 The instant court further noted that, while this
information was not available at the time Bobbittwas decided, the fact that
it is available now makes reconsideration of Bobbitt appropriate.'
Furthermore, the court expressed a concern that depriving battered spouses
of the right to defend themselves by imposing upon them a duty to retreat
only reinforced the popular misconception that victims of spousal abuse
can walk away from the abusive relationship at any time, but instead
choose to stay, and are therefore partly to blame for their situation.45
Finally, the instant court justified its reversal of Bobbitt by noting the
post-Bobbitt changes in public policy as seen in the government's
responses to the problem of domestic violence.46 The court pointed to the
executive branch's establishment of a domestic violence task force, the
Legislature's enactment of laws to protect domestic violence victims, and
the judiciary's establishment of special courts, task forces, and judicial
training programs dealing with domestic violence. 47
Therefore, after reviewing the underlying policy of the castle doctrine,
its subsequent evolution, recognizing the illogical distinction made
between an invitee and a co-inhabitant, and considering the sweeping
changes in public and social policy with regard to domestic violence, the
48
court reasoned that a reversal of Bobbitt was appropriate at this time.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 1052.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1052-53.
See id. at 1053.
See id. at 1053-54, 1055 n.12.
See id. at 1054.
See id. at 1054-56.
See id.
See id. at 1049-57.
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Thus, a party under attack now has no duty to retreat from the home before
using deadly force against a trespasser, invitee, or co-inhabitant when
resorting to such force is necessary to avert death or serious bodily harm.49
However, the court did include the caveat that while a party does not have
to retreat fully from the home, that party is required to retreat within the
residence if possible.50
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Weiand adjusts what once was
an illogical line drawn between legal protections afforded to persons
defending themselves against invitees and persons defending themselves
against co-inhabitants.5 1 Allowing a person to stay and defend against an
invitee, but requiring that person to retreat rather than defend against a coinhabitant, creates an unreasonable distinction between the two because in
both situations the aggressor has a legal right to be in the home. 2 However,
in Weiand, the court disregarded one of the premises it depended on to
draw that line in Bobbitt-thatonce an invitee becomes an attacker, that
invitee's status changes to a trespasser and the legal right to be on the
premises is revoked. 3 Thus, what may be considered an arbitrary line does
have a reasonable legal basis. 4
While there is a reasonable basis for drawing the line between invitees
and co-occupants as in Bobbin, Weiand's decision to remove that line
provides a more equitable outcome. 5 Now, rather than allowing concern
over possessory rights to in effect provide protection to the attacker, the
new rule affords more legal protection to the defendant, who may actually
be the real victim. 56 As a result, by allowing co-inhabitants to invoke the
castle doctrine, the new rule leads to a greater focus on the social
relationships between the parties, rather than the legal status of the
aggressor as an invitee or co-inhabitant within the home. 7
For example, under the old rule, a paramour in fear for her life could
use deadly force to defend against a visiting lover, while that same
paramour, still in fear for her life, would be forced to retreat from the home
if the attacker was a live-in lover.58 Similarly, while a parent resorting to

49. See id. at 1058.
50. See id.
51. Seeid. at 1052.
52. See id.
53. See generally id. at 1050-52.
54. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1982).
55. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052; Bobbit, 415 So. 2d at 726.
56. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052, 1054.
57. See id. at 1052. However, the Court made it clear that the castle doctrine is not limited
to use by co-occupants who are victims of domestic violence. See id. at 1057. Instead, the rule
applies to all co-occupants who resort to deadly force to defend against an attack by another cooccupant. See id.
58. See id.
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deadly force to defend against a visiting child would be granted the
protection of the castle doctrine, the same parent would be forced to retreat
from the home if the child putting her in fear for her life also resided in the
home.5 9 As a result, defendants with valid reasons to fear for their lives
who killed an attacker in self-defense would suffer different legal
consequences if they happened to live with the person who attacked them
than if that same person was an invited guest in their home.'
The new rule as formulated in Weiand shifts the emphasis from
property rights and legal status to an emphasis on the value of human life."
Before Weiand extended the castle doctrine to co-occupants, the rule
reflected the significance of possessory and property rights when dealing
with issues related to the home. 2 While these policy considerations were
critical to the formation of the castle doctrine and its extension to situations
where the attacker is an invitee, they were inadequate in terms of
ultimately protecting human life.63 By focusing solely on property
concerns, the increasingly recognized plight of domestic violence victims
was ignored.6 Therefore, under Weiand, the court's former concern with
who had a legal right to be in the home was replaced with a greater concern
for who had a right to defend themselves against an aggressor. 65

59. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774,775-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (upholding the
defendant's conviction where the defendant shot her mentally ill son who resided with her after he
attacked her in the home). The Connercourt reasoned that the sanctity of human life-referring to
the attacker's life-is more important than the dignity of the attackee/defendant who is forced to
retreat from the home. See id.
60. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052.
61. See id. at 1051-54.
62. See id. Common law property and possessory rights regarding the home are twofold. See
id. at 1049-50. First, there is the policy that one should be able to defend one's home frominvasion
rather than be forced out of it. See id. at 1050. Second, since home is one's sanctuary, one who has
a legal right to be in the home should be able to stand his ground. See id. at 1049-50; Babbitt, 415
So. 2d at 725. In the past, courts have emphasized that where co-occupants have equal rights to
stand their ground, the castle doctrine should not apply. See Babbitt,415 So. 2d at 726; see also
Conner,361 So. 2d at 776; Stevenson v. State, 285 So. 2d 61, 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). While this
seemingly allows both parties to assert their possessory rights, it is a fallacy because it actually
allows the attacker to assert his/her possessory right. In effect, prohibiting a party under attack from
using the castle doctrine forces that party to retreat, thus giving up their possessory rights to the
home. Meanwhile, the aggressor is allowed to assert his possessory rights. If neither party has "the
legal right to eject the other," it does not seem reasonable to give an aggressor legal protection when
he effectually, if not literally, ejects the victim of his attack. Babbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
63. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049-54; see also Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla.
1965). The instant court cited several studies that show that victims of domestic violence are more
often killed or severely injured when they attempt to follow their legal duty to retreat because
spouse abusers are only further enraged when their victims try to leave. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at
1053-54.
64. See id. at 1052-55.
65. See id. at 1053; see also Babbitt,415 So. 2d at 726.
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Furthermore, the earlier decisions upon which the court relied in Bobbitt
that did consider the value of human life actually favored the life of the
attacker.' Therefore, while victims of domestic abuse previously had to
give up their rights to the shelter of their homes to avoid depriving their
abusers of that right, the law now recognizes that it is unreasonable, and
often more dangerous, to force domestic violence victims into this
position. 67
Although the rule as it was pronounced in Weiand is a step forward in
affording more protection to victims of domestic violence, it leaves room
for misuse. 8 The court has previously recognized that the castle doctrine
should not be used to protect a party who lies in wait for his adversary and
deliberately uses force for reasons other than self-defense under the guise
of the castle doctrine. 69 However, the court dismisses this concern in
Weiand, and its holding leaves open the opportunity for abuse of the rule
in situations where a domestic violence victim takes a preemptive strike
and later claims self-defense and the protection of the castle doctrine.70
This appears to be possible because, although Weiand makes it clear that
there is a limited duty to retreat within the residence if at all possible
before resorting to deadly force, there is nothing enunciated in the rule
regarding the application of the castle doctrine to co-inhabitants that
requires that the feared death or great bodily harm must be imminent.7 The
rule formulated by the court reads, "[T]here is no duty to retreat from the
residence before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or invitee
if necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm, although there is a
limited duty to retreat within the residence to the extent reasonably
possible."72 The word "imminent" is conspicuously left out of the clause

66. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1056-57; see also Conner,361 So. 2d at 776 (expressing a
concern for human life such that the taking of the aggressor's life should not be considered as an
option until the option of retreat has been exhausted); Hedges, 172 So. 2d at 827 (allowing the
castle doctrine to apply to co-inhabitants, but pointing out that the duty to retreat arises from the
policy interest in having the victim of an attack avoid taking a human life).
67. Compare Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052-54, with Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.

68. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1056-57.
69. See Pell, 122 So. at 116 (warning that while one has no duty to retreat from his premises
to avoid death or great bodily harm, one cannot lie in wait for his foe or claim the protection of the
castle doctrine for an altercation that he provoked); Wilson v. State, 11 So. 556,560-61 (Fla. 1892).
70. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1056. The court, which relied heavily on psychological and
sociological studies regarding domestic violence in making its decision to reverse Bobbitt, further
asserted that the lack of empirical data showing a correlation between allowing domestic violence
victims to assert the castle doctrine and an increase in domestic violence was reason enough to
believe the rule would not be abused. See id. The court further suggested that the rule precluded
abuse because it included a limited duty to retreat within the residence. See id.
71. See id. at 1058.
72. Id.
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"if necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm. ' 73 Thus the court has
left a loophole by failing to clearly assert that the rule cannot be invoked
at a time of peace in the home as a preemptive strike to possible future
abuse.74
The Florida Supreme Court ruling in Weiand demonstrates a greater
understanding of the implications of the battered spouse syndrome. 75 It
provides for greater legal protection to victims of domestic violence than
was previously available under Bobbitt.76 However, it also creates the risk
that more victims of domestic violence will effect their own justice and
subsequently depend on the legal system to endorse this action. Until the
rule clearly states that the abused spouse must be in imminent danger or
until the court establishes a test that shows that the deadly force used was
not retaliatory or preemptive, this rule has the potential to be abused.

73. Id.
74. See id. Perhaps the Court assumes that since the duty to retreat or the privilege of nonretreat are common law corollaries to the statutory justifications for the use of deadly force in self
defense, which are only available when danger of death or great bodily harm is imminent, it is not
necessary to specify this in regards to the privilege of non-retreat. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (1999).
75. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1052-57.
76. Compare id., with Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
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